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Book  Review 
Thomas Reid’s Theory of Perception 
Ryan Nichols 
Clarendon Press, 2007. xvi + 302 pp. £40.00   
r e v i e w e d  b y
Jennifer McKitrick 
University of Nebraska–Lincoln   
In Thomas Reid’s Theory of Perception, Ryan Nichols presents an in-
terpretation and critique of the views of one of the most interesting 
thinkers of the early modern period, in particular, as the title indi-
cates, those relating to perception. The book covers Reid’s Newton-
ian method, perception through touch and vision, the intentionality 
of perceptual states, the role of sensations in perception, perception 
of primary and secondary qualities, and the unity of perception via a 
discussion of Molyneux’s question regarding the perceptual abilities 
of one with recently acquired sight. Nichols’s book is somewhat chal-
lenging, more suitable to someone who is familiar with Reid’s the-
ory of perception and ongoing debates in the secondary literature 
than to someone who is just looking to find out about Reid’s views. 
As Nichols notes, Reid’s own writing is very clear and there’s no rea-
son to think that Reid was less than forthcoming about his views (p. 
1). While Nichols claims to interpret and critique Reid’s views, I would 
have appreciated more indication of overarching themes, or guidance 
as to where the discussions were going. Fortunately, the efforts nec-
essary to work through Nichols’s text are paid off by some very in-
teresting and valuable discussions, particularly the sections on direct 
realism, acquired perceptions, and Molyneux’s Question. Rather than 
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summarize and give further praise to those sections, I’ll turn my atten-
tion to those sections I found more problematic. In what follows, I’ll 
take issue with Nichols’s discussion of Reid’s ‘Blind Book’ argument, 
visible figure, and the primary quality/secondary quality distinction. 
In Chapter 2, Nichols discusses Reid’s ideas about intentional 
awareness, an element of perception, elsewhere called ‘conceptual 
awareness’, ‘conception’ or ‘apprehension’, characterized as an object-
oriented mental state, or a conscious state that is about something (p. 
43). Here, Nichols argues that Reid shows that intentionality is irre-
ducible with his ‘Blind Book’ argument against the Theory of Ideas. 
Like the subject in Searle’s Chinese room, Reid imagines an illiterate 
savage examining a book. Not only would he not know if there was 
anything in the world that corresponded to the marks in the book, the 
savage wouldn’t know that the marks meant anything. According to 
Reid, as Nichols interprets him, if the Theory of Ideas were true, we 
would be in a similar position with respect to our own mental states: 
we wouldn’t know what, if anything, our states represent. 
I find this argument somewhat confusing. The expression ‘what my 
mental states represent’ seems ambiguous to me. It can mean the ac-
tual mind-independent state of affairs in the external world that my 
mental states are about, or it can mean the way my mental states rep-
resent the world as being, which may or may not be the case. Now, if 
the immediate objects of my perception are just my own ideas, I can 
see why that would lead me to wonder whether there are any mind-
independent objects in the world corresponding to those ideas. How-
ever, it is not clear to me why supposing that the immediate objects of 
my perception are my own ideas would lead me to think that I don’t 
know how my mental states represent the world as being—that I don’t 
know how the world seems to me. For example, suppose I have a vi-
sual experience of something red. It’s a datum of introspection that, 
given that experience, the world would seem to me to have something 
red in it. If the Theory of Ideas is right, I might have cause to be skep-
tical about whether there is a mind-independent red object in my en-
vironment. However, I don’t see why that should lead me to say that I 
don’t know that my experience represents the world as having some-
thing red in it. Perhaps the analogy to the illiterate savage is supposed 
to show that my visual experience of something red stands in no bet-
ter relation to a belief that there’s a red thing in my environment than 
McKitrick  in  Philosophical  Books  49  (2008)       3
squiggles on a page stand to a belief in some possible object that the 
squiggles describe in some language that I don’t understand. But I’m 
not sure why I’m supposed to think that the analogy is still holding 
up at this point. 
In Chapter 4, Nichols explores Reid’s thoughts about visual percep-
tion, particularly ‘visible figure’—roughly the two-dimensional shape 
an object seems to have from the observer’s perspective. When I see 
a tabletop from across the room, while its real figure is rectangular, 
its apparent visible figure is trapezoidal. Reid’s claim that visible fig-
ures are immediate objects of visual perception puts his view at odds 
with his own rejection of the perceptual intermediaries of the The-
ory of Ideas. Nichols tries to extricate Reid from this conundrum by 
arguing that a visible figure is not like an idea but is instead a mind- 
independent relational property—a relation between an object and an 
eye ( just one eye, because ‘the geometry of the visibles’ is calculated 
for monocular vision). Furthermore, Nichols says visible figures are 
mind-independent because they are independent of particular visual 
systems. If you stand exactly where I stood in front of the tabletop, po-
sitioning one eye in the same place where one of my eyes was, there 
would be the “same seen figure” (p. 122). 
While I appreciate the effort to solve the mystery of the ontologi-
cal status of visible figures, I have some worries about Nichols’s sug-
gestion. First of all, it’s not clear how Nichols is thinking about iden-
tity conditions for relations. Two different pairs of individuals could 
presumably stand in the same type of relation: two couples could in-
stantiate the same relation, ‘being married’. However, it seems that 
two different pairs of individuals could not stand in the same token 
relation, and if one of the relata change, there’s a different token re-
lation. So, if Sam divorces Suzy and marries Pam, while Sam stands 
in the same type of relation to Pam as he stood to Suzy, there’s a clear 
sense in which Sam is not in the same marriage. So, the relation that 
my eye has to the tabletop is not the same token relation that your eye 
does. I don’t know if the token relation is independent of my mind, 
but it’s not independent of my eye. 
What’s more problematic is that thinking of visible figure as a re-
lational property doesn’t cohere well with other things that are said 
about it (p. 113). Visible figure is said to be capable of being repre-
sented by a figure cast upon the inner surface of a sphere, but it’s not 
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clear that the relation between an object and my eye is capable of be-
ing represented in that way. Visible figure is something of which we 
can be perceptually aware, but it seems as if what we are aware of in 
those instances is a figure, not a relation. I don’t know what it means 
to say that my eye stands in the ‘visible figure’ relation to the table-
top. Perhaps the visible figure relation incorporates spatial relations. 
But Nichols attributes to Reid the view that one can perceive a visible 
figure without perceiving the distance between one’s eye and the per-
ceived object (p. 122). He attributes to Reid the view that real figure 
is derivable from visible figure plus distance and position (p. 114), but 
if visible figure incorporates the spatial relation between the eye and 
the object, one would be able to derive real figure from visible figure 
alone. If visible figure is a non-spatial relation between an object and 
an eye, the nature of this property is still mysterious to me. 
Chapter 5 concerns perception of primary and secondary quali-
ties. Traditionally, the distinction between these qualities is roughly 
that primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion are in some 
sense objective, observer-independent features of the world, while 
secondary qualities, such as color, smell, taste, and sound, are more 
closely tied to our particular human perceptual perspective. Accord-
ing to Nichols, Reid departs from this tradition by construing the dis-
tinction as a conceptual one, rather than a metaphysical one. Concepts 
of primary qualities are clear and distinct, while concepts of second-
ary qualities are merely concepts of unknown causes of sensations. 
Nichols addresses the question of whether ‘secondary quality’ refers 
to the sensation caused, the disposition to cause the sensation, or the 
physical cause of the sensation (the causal base). Based on plausible 
textual evidence, he settles on the third of these options. 
Nichols rejects claims that Reid holds a view that Nichols calls both 
‘dispositionalism’ and ‘the identity thesis’. However, it’s not clear just 
what is being rejected. There’s no consensus on use of the term ‘dis-
positionalism’, and the content of an identity thesis is only as clear as 
the specification of what is being identified with what. Nichols claims 
that Reid does not identify dispositions to cause sensations with their 
causal bases, but Nichols does not call this claim “the identity thesis” 
(p. 172). Instead, Nichols says that ‘dispositionalism’ identifies a sec-
ondary quality with a set of counterfactual conditions (p. 173). But it’s 
not clear that anyone ever held, or attributed to Reid, the view that a 
quality, such as redness, is a set of counterfactual conditions. 
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Nichols goes on to say that the ‘the identity thesis’ identifies a sec-
ondary quality with the property that fulfils a set of counterfactual 
conditions having to do with how agents would respond to certain 
physical properties. For example, if I were in the presence of an aro-
matic rose, I would experience a certain olfactory sensation. In this 
case, according to ‘the identity thesis’, the secondary property is what-
ever property is such that, if it were present to me, in normal con-
ditions, I would experience a certain sensation. It seems to me that 
the property that fulfils this counterfactual condition is the physi-
cal cause of my sensation—the causal basis. If this is right, then what 
Nichols calls ‘the identity thesis’ identifies the secondary quality with 
a causal basis. And, if this is right, then Nichols’s claims that Reid re-
jects ‘the identity thesis’, and that he holds that secondary qualities 
are the physical properties that cause sensations are clearly inconsis-
tent. If this is wrong, I wonder which property Nichols thinks fulfils 
the counterfactual conditions, if not the causal basis. 
Elsewhere, Nichols uses ‘dispositionalism’ for the view which iden-
tifies secondary qualities with dispositions to cause sensations (p. 
173). He goes on to claim that Reid’s remarks that colors are quali-
ties in bodies and not sensations amount to a denial of the identity 
thesis (p. 176). But this would only make sense if ‘the identity thesis’ 
identifies the secondary quality with the sensation. Secondary qual-
ities being qualities in bodies and not sensations is consistent with 
identifying secondary qualities with causal bases, secondary quali-
ties with dispositions, or dispositions with causal bases. In the end, 
I’m not sure what ‘the identity thesis’ is supposed to be, or why Nich-
ols declines to attribute some identity thesis to Reid. The claim that 
such a thesis would be too metaphysical for Reid is at odds with Nich-
ols’s claim that Reid identifies secondary qualities with the physical 
causes of sensations. 
